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TITLE 
“Monetary and relative scorecards to assess profits in consumer revolving credit”  
 
ABSTRACT 
This paper presents for the first time a relative profit measure for scoring purposes and 
compares results with those obtained from monetary scores. The suggested measure is the cumulative 
profit relative to the outstanding debt. It can also be interpreted as the percentage coverage against 
default. Monetary and relative measures are compared with both being estimated using direct and 
indirect methods.  Direct scores are obtained from borrower attributes, whilst indirect scores are 
predicted using the estimated probabilities of default and repurchase. Results show that specific 
segments of customers with specific attributes are profitable in both monetary and relative terms. The 
best performing indirect models use the probabilities of default within 12 months on books and of 
repurchase during 30 months as predictors. This agrees with existing banking practices of default 
estimation and confirms the significance of the long term perspective on customer value forin 
revolving credit. Direct models outperform indirect models.  Relative scores would be preferred under 
more conservative standpoints towards default because of unstable conditions and if the aim is to 




Profit scoring, return scoring, credit risk, accounting, banking, inclusive lending 
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INTRODUCTION 
The use of credit scoring models became a usual practice in consumer lending since the 
1980’s (US Senate, 1979; Rosenberg and Glait, 1994). The literature on credit scoring is extensive 
and previous studies are devoted to produce default models based on application and/or behavioural 
characteristics of samples of individuals that werehave already been granted credit by the lending 
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institution. Such models are then applied to new applicants to decide on their eligibility to be granted 
credit (Rosenberg and Gleit, 1994; Hand and Henley, 1997). 
In the late 1990’s, it was suggested that customers should be scored according to their profit 
profile (Lucas, 2001). Profit scoring is directly related to the concept of customer lifetime value 
(CLV), which can be quantified as the net present value of the discounted cash flows generated by 
customers (Berger and Nasr, 1998; Andon et al., 2001; Collings and Baxter, 2005; Pfeifer et al. 2005; 
Ryals and Knox, 2005). Furthermore, CLV has been used to value companies by using their customer 
base (Gupta and Lehmann, 2003). Consequently, there has been a progression from default to profit 
scoring among academics and practitioners. The objective has shifted to accept applicants with higher 
expected profit rather than with lower probability of default. 
In previous studies, individuals were scored according to their expected cumulative profits 
during the forecast period (Andreeva et al., 2007; Finlay, 2008; Ma et al., 2009; Finlay, 2010; Lieli 
and White, 2010). The cited papers share a common feature: all of them use monetary based 
measures. Under that perspective, higher scores are aligned with higher monetary profits, regardless 
of the investment per customer via their outstanding debt. Two customers may yield the same profits 
and hence be assigned the same scores; yet in relativeon to the amount borrowed terms their  
situationattractiveness might not be the same. Therefore, it is useful to measure the productivity of the 
funds invested per customer. This rationale agrees with the use of monetary measures and relative 
ratios to assess the performance of lending institutions (Engels, 2010; Rasiah, 2010). 
The aim of this paper is to present for the first time a relative profit measure as an alternative 
approach to score customers. That is, scaling the CLV by the outstanding debt is useful to provide a 
fair comparison of customers’ profits. Additionally, it is shown that instead of considering default and 
profits separately, a relative profit measure actually takes into account both aspects. The measure 
presented in this study is by no means the only alternative to score customers in relative terms. Rather 
than referring to it as a return measure, which requires a more thorough inclusion of the total assets 
used to obtain the profits per customer, it should be regarded as a relative profit. 
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This paper extends the literature on the design of profit scores using direct and indirect 
methods. Direct scores are obtained by the use of observed attributes from individuals. Indirect 
methods require the prediction of intermediate variables before producing the final scores. In the case 
under analysis, sociodemographic, purchase and credit behaviour variables are used to produce direct 
scores and to predict the probabilities of default and repurchase. These probabilities are also used to 
obtain indirect profit scores. Similar methods have been used in a credit scoring context (Li and Hand, 
2002), but not for profit scoring purposes of revolving credits. It also revisits the incidence of default 
and repurchase in revolving credits (Andreeva et al., 2005; Andreeva et al., 2007). 
An additional motivation to use a relative profit measure for scoring purposes derives from 
the inclusive lending features of the case under analysis. The sample of customers used in this study 
belongs to a credit programme launched in 2007 by a Colombian lending institution. The aim of the 
programme is to offer financial services to segments considered high risks because they lack previous 
records with the credit bureaus and hence have been financially excluded. These segments usually 
rely on informal lending, with all the additional financial and safety costs attached to it. This is a 
common practice for unbanked segments in Latin American emerging economies (Prior and 
Argandoña, 2009). 
The lending institution under analysis decided to use the individuals’ previous payment 
behaviour of utility bills as the sole criterion to grant credit and to set credit limits. This practice is 
similar to the use of social rent payment data for credit granting decisions, suggested in the UK 
context (Wilkinson, 2011).  The scaling effect of a relative measure would be a more responsible 
approach to score customers because it accounts for the outstanding debt instead of relying solely on 
monetary profits that might derive from default or repurchase. This could be useful to tackle ethical 
issues of responsible lending to vulnerable communities; this has not been considered in previous 
studies.  
This paper is organised as follows: Iinitially, the suggested monetary and relative profit 
measures are presented. Selected descriptive statistic results are analysed for each measure to provide 
the rationale of the subsequent sections. Default and repurchase scorecards are presented prior to 
using them as predictors for indirect monetary and relative scorecards. Direct monetary and relative 
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scorecards are presented and contrasted with indirect scorecards. The impact of monetary and relative 
profit scorecards at portfolio level is then analysed; recommendations are presented in each case. 
Finally, a set of conclusions and ideas for further research are presented. 
 
MONETARY AND RELATIVE PROFIT MEASURES  
This section presents the suggested measures for an outcome variable in profit scoring models 
and the results of descriptive statistics for each measure. 
 
Suggested measures 
At the portfolio level various measures have been mentioned in the accounting literature to 
assess the performance of business units: income based measures (e.g. residual income and EVA™) 
and ratios (e.g.: return on investment and cash flow return on investment) (Drury, 2000; Hirsch, 2000; 
Fitzgerald, 2007). Two similar types of measures are used in this study to score customers in 
monetary and relative terms: EBITACUMt and ROACUMt. Specifically, calculations and further 
analyses are performed at t=30 months, where t is time from the first purchase onwards. This 
impliedis equivalent to adopting a long term perspective, which agrees with the nature of revolving 
credit. Even though the term “profit” will continue to be used throughout this paper, the suggested 
measures are cash based. This is the usual practice in a scoring context.  
 
EBITACUMt  
This measure, EBITACUMt, is based on the earnings before interests, taxes, depreciations 
and amortizations (EBITA). It is the cumulative operational profit per customer, after deducting 
variable and fixed costs from the income generated via interests and commissions.  Fixed overheads 
were allocated equally among active customers, according to the Company’s practices. An advantage 
of using this measure is that it enables a straightforward comparison of customers in monetary terms. 
Some managers understand better the concept of monetary profits and hence would support its use for 
scoring purposes; this is the case where credit units are assessed as profit centres instead of 
investment centres. A natural threshold for this measure is 0. Considering that various segments of 
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customers are usually served through credit programmes, it leads to the comparison of different 
segments with different purchase capacity and credit payment behaviour. Therefore, a disadvantage of 
this monetary measure is that customers with higher profits obtain better scores, regardless of the 
required investment (i.e.: the outstanding balance) and their intrinsic attributes. A relative measure is 
therefore required to effectively compare customers. 
Customers joined the sample in y=0 to 14 consecutive monthly cohorts. Each customer was 
observed during t=1 to 30 months. First, EBITAZ was calculated for each z=t+y month (i.e.: z Є {1, 2, 
3 ...44}) for each customer. Second, monthly profits excluding those of the base month were deflated 
according to the monthly inflation:  
  
zzz dfEBITAEBITAdef                                                                           (1) 
where dfz=monthly deflation factor to express figures relative to the base month 
Third, to guarantee a single starting point, deflated profits of each cohort y were discounted during y 
periods at the opportunity cost r. This rate could be interpreted as the cost of capital of the funds 
invested in the credit programme: 
y
zt rEBITAdefEBITAdisc )1/(                                                         (2) 








t rEBITAdiscEBITAcum                                                (3) 
 
ROACUMt 
In contrast, ROACUMt    measures the profit performance relative to the required investment 
per customer. It is important to note that even though the term stands for the cumulative return on 
assets, strictly speaking this measure should be understood as a proxy of such return. The lending 
institution does not discriminate the fixed assets used in the credit programme and hence assumes that 
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the relevant assets for scoring purposes are the outstanding receivables at t=30 months. It is useful not 
only to quantify the scaled profit performance per customer but also to actually score them based on 
their relative performance. Therefore, it enables a fair comparison of the profits generated by 
customers. This measure can also be understood as the coverage against default if the Company stops 
its operations at time t=30 months. Under a very conservative standpoint, the minimum value should 
be 1. This implies complete coverage against default regardless of future payments. A disadvantage of 
this measure is that it is not always understood by managers that consider their credit units profit 






ROAcum                                          (4) 
where finalbalancFBedeft= deflated final balance at time t.  
 
Descriptive statistics 
This section shows the main results from descriptive statistics of the case under analysis. 
Values are not displayed for confidentiality reasons. 
Initially, monetary and relative measures were obtained monthly per customer (n=35,530) 
during t=30 months. After excluding from the sample those with missing data at t=12, 24 or 30 
months, 33,964 customers were left. This was done based on a rationale of considering those 
customers that maintained a continuing relationship with the Company during the observation period. 
Almost all customers were profitable in monetary and relative terms (i.e.: 99.7% of the sample). 
Figures are not shown for confidentiality reasons. 
Initially, the total sample was randomly split (80/20) in training1 sample1 and holdout1 
samples1, 27157 and 6807 customers respectively. The distributions of EBITACUM30 and ROACUM30 
had outliers. Difference in results between the training and holdout samples for ROACUM30 primarily 
resulted from extreme outliers. This follows from the relative nature of ROACUM30, which magnifies 
profits or losses in relative terms when the outstanding balance is very low. This might be the result of 
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approximations in the calculation of the outstanding balance, which lead to values that are not 
significant in economic terms but that define those customers as active in the data base. 
In order to visualize the distributions without the effect of outliers, 5% of the total 
observations were excluded from the training and holdout samples. Such observations exceeded 1.5 
times the interquartile range. Specifically, customers with returns less than -0.5 or greater than 1.51 
were considered outliers. Such extreme observations were added back when model quality was tested. 
This was done based on the feasibility that customers with returns less than -0.5 might experience a 
reduction of approximately half of the credit limit, whereas those that at most were covered 1.5 times 
against default could have their credit limit increased in the same proportion.   
The mean EBITACUM30 over the three years did not exceed the minimum monthly wage in 
Colombia. This confirms the inclusive lending nature of the credit programme. The average 
ROACUM30 shows a significant coverage against default because of the greater interests paid in the 
long term. Figure 1 shows the distribution of EBITACUM30 for samples without outliers: training2 
sample2 (label=1) and holdout2 sample2 (label=0), 24617 and 6186 customers respectively. Actual 
Ffigures were scaleddivided by the greatest values for confidentiality reasons. The distribution of 
EBITACUM30 (ROACUM30) is skewed to the left (right). In absolute value, ROACUM30 is more 
skewed than EBITACUM30. These features highlight the nature of both measures: Mmore customers 
may yield higher profits in monetary terms. In relative terms the case is not the same because of the 
scaling nature of ratios via the outstanding balance.  ROACUM30 has a higher kurtosis as a result of 
the higher concentration of observations resulting from the scaling effect. Customers that yield losses 
are still present, but only a very small number ofs minor cases. Consequently, lending to those that are 
financially excluded is a profitable business. 
Figure 2 shows the joint behaviour of EBITACUM30 and ROACUM30 for training2 sample2. 
Results for holdout2 sample2 are similar and available upon request. Overall, it is evident that higher 
profits lead to higher returns. This follows from the direct relationship between cumulative profits and 
returns, as defined before. It is evident however, that the relationship is not strictly linear. Customers 
have the same level of profits (returns) and various levels of returns (profits). Intuitively, it makes 
sense then to score customers according to each measure and assess the impact on portfolio results. 
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DEFAULT AND REPURCHASE SCORECARDS  
Prior to generating indirect scores, the probabilities of default and repurchase were modelled 
through logistic regression.  Logistic regression is a common classification technique in the banking 
industry. It produces good results when compared with more sophisticated techniques (Baesens et al., 
2003).  Models can be evaluated in terms of the Area Under the Receiver Operating Curve (AUROC) 
(Thomas, 2009). In the case under analysis a stepwise procedure was used, defining a 0.01 
significance level entrance for variables. In a default context, bads were defined as those customers 
that experienced default; goods in repurchase models were customers that made further purchases 
after the first one. Default and repurchase models were produced accordingly. 
Two approaches were taken for modelling purposes: Mmodels were developed using training1 
sample1 and then were tested on holdout1 sample1 (; these models are identified with the 
subscriptapproach/models: a). Additionally, a ten-fold cross validation (approach/models b) was 
conducted on the complete sample (training1 + holdout1) to verify the robustness of results obtained 
from the former approach a. The sample was randomly divided into 10 subsets, the model was 
developed on 9 subsets, and tested on the remaining one, the process was repeated 10 times, each time 
with a different test subgroup. Averages were then calculated for measures of predictive accuracy 
(Tables 2 and 3). Models were produced for ten random samples that accounted each for 90% of the 
total sample and then were tested in the remaining observations. In order to obtain one set of 
parameters, Tthe overallfinal model was then run on the complete sample by using variables that were 
significant in at least 6 folds. This has been done before in a credit scoring context ((Lin et al., 2012). 
These models are identified with the subscript: b. 
 
Predictor variables 
A set of sociodemographic, purchase and credit related variables (recorded at the time of the 
first purchase) were gatheredused to predict the probabilities of default and repurchase. These 
characteristics were obtained at the time of first purchase; see Table 1. 
Formatted: Font: Not Italic
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For prediction purposes, continuous variables were initially classified in decile categories. 
Categorical variables were classified according to the general categories that were provided by the 
Company.  Further coarse classification was based on the market’s knowledge (categorical variables) 
and collapsing adjacent categories (numerical variables). The same coarse classification was used to 
produce default, repurchase, direct and indirect models for comparison purposes. The coarse-classes 
were coded as binary (dummy) variables.  
For confidentiality reasons Tthe coefficients and odds ratios of significant variables in the 
models arecan not displayed for confidentiality reasons, this applies to all models in this paper.  
 
Default 
A customer was considered to be in default if she was at least 3 months in arrears. Models 
were developed for Pr (default at t=12 months) according to standard banking practices and for Pr 
(default at t=30 months), following a long term perspective. In the former case, the standpoint was 
more conservative; in the latter, it was more profit-oriented. It should be noted, however, that 
customers can still be at arrears without reaching default. This generates additional interests 
payments/ charges that result in higher profits. 
 
DEF1: Pr (default at t=12) 
Common significant variables in models DEF1a,b include dummies related with marital 
status, education level, type of product and credit limit usage. Specifically, cohabitators are more 
likely to default than singles. The informality of their relationship may be affecting their commitment 
towards paying the credit.  In termsAs for type of product, it does make a difference in terms of 
default when customers purchase products different to those offered traditionally by the lending 
institution. This may occur because customers do not relate directly these products with the usual 
portfolio of products. Moreover, these products may be considered luxury goods that customers would 
not buy under normal circumstances. These aspects may affect their commitment towards paying 
loans derived from unusual products. Customers that used their credit limit at an intermediate level 
are less likely to default than those in the lowest category. These individuals might grantattach more 




importance to keeping a clean credit record than those in the lowest category and hence are more 
motivated to avoid default. Compared with customers with missing education level,  according to 
model DEF1a, those with secondary education are more likely to default. In contrast, model DEF1b 
shows that customers with primary education are less likely to be in default.  
 
 
DEF2: Pr (default at t=30) 
In the long term, significant variables in models DEF2a,b were the same. These include 
dummies related with age, location, job and marital status. Customers from older age groups are less 
likely to default. Major investments in education, real estate, and other durables have been made 
earlier. People at such stage are expected to have less financial commitments and hence have more 
cash available to pay their loans. Those that live in the capital city are less likely to default than 
customers from rural areas. This could be related withto  higher income and greater importance given 
to building a positive credit record in urban areas. Self-employed customers are more likely to default 
than those employed. The instability of irregular income under formal or informal conditions affects 
their ability to pay on time. Finally, married individuals are less likely to default than singles. Formal 
marital relationships imply regular household financial commitments. This creates the habit of paying 
financial obligations on time, when compared with singles. 
 
Default in the short and long term  
In the long term, it does not make a difference what type of product was purchased first. It 
seems then that as time goes on, customers relate more the credit programme with the financing of 
products different to those offered traditionally by the lending institution. The formality of marital 
status plays an important role in the long term in terms of decreasing the probability of default. The 
duration of the first loan is not significant to predict default in the short and long terms. This makes 
sense, since only those customers that were active at t=12, 24 and 30 months were considered. This 
guarantees that they had outstanding loans throughout the observation period regardless of the 
duration of the first loan. Finally, stratum and certain occupations that usually do not generate income 
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(e.g.: students and housewives) were not significant in the short and long terms. From a credit risk 
perspective, these results justify inclusive lending in segments that traditionally are considered high 





Following a similar logic to that of default, the probabilities of repurchase during t=12 and 
t=30 months were modelled. This is also consistent with the long term nature of revolving credits. 
 
REP1: Pr (repurchase during t=12 months)  
Common significant variables in models REP1a,b include dummies related withrepresenting 
stratum, education level, loan duration, credit limit usage and type of product. Specifically, customers 
from higher stratums and with secondary level studies are more likely to repurchase than those from 
poor stratums and missing level of studies, respectively. These results follow from a greater purchase 
capacity associated towith wealthier and more educated individuals, especially in developing 
countries as Colombia. More credit limit usage leads to a lower probability of repurchase because of 
less available credit limit and/or a more conservative attitude towards spending. Customers with loan 
durations of at least three years are less likely to repurchase during the first year than those with loan 
durations of 12 or 31 months. This may result from greater purchases made in the long term, which do 
not justify additional spending during the first year. A first purchase that includes products that may 
be considered luxury goods, leads to a lower probability of repurchase during the first year than that 
of traditional goods. These products may be valued as major investments that hinder customers from 
making further purchases. According to model REP1a, customers with secondary education are more 
likely to repurchase than those with missing level of studiesvalues. In model REP1b older customers 
are more likely to repurchase than younger customers, whereas customers with missing marital status 
are less likely to repurchase than singles. These results might be related with a customer’s life stage. 
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REP2: Pr (repurchase during t=30 months)  
According to models REP2a,b, in the long term customers that take longer term loans, use 
more their credit limit, have completed primary studies or have more dependants are less likely to 
repurchase. Those variables imply more financial commitments and hence less purchasing power. 
Likewise, customers with missing marital status may not consider a priority buying new household 
products. On the other hand, customers from older age groups, urban areas or higher socioeconomic 
stratums are more likely to repurchase in the long term. These characteristics usually have attached a 
higher purchasing power resulting from better economic conditions due to life cycle or location. 
Results for type of product are similar to those of the previous section. If a customer works in the 
manufacturing industry, repurchase is less likely compared with a customer from the services 
industry. This might result from different economic conditions and wages in both sectors. An 
additional feature of Model REP2b is that retired customers are more likely to repurchase in the long 
term than employed customers. This may derive from a greater purchase capacity of this segment at 
that stage of their lives. 
 
Repurchase in the short term versus long term  
A more parsimonious model for the short term compared with that of the long term confirms 
that additional attributes account for the repurchase behaviour of customers. However, the majority of 
significant variables in the short term are significant as well in the long term. Attributes such as 
stratum, loan duration, credit limit usage and type of product are relatively stable in the long term, 
unless a major shift in the socioeconomic conditions of a customer occurs. Given the significance of 
the variable stratum in the short and long terms, the effect of socioeconomic differences between 
individuals is evident. These results suggest that regardless of their lower purchase capacity, 
belonging to poor stratums not necessarily implies default. These findings provide further support to 
inclusive lending strategies. Results for the AUROC of each model are shown on Table 2. 
 
MONETARY AND RELATIVE SCORECARDS 
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Revolving credit is a long term product that requires time to yield profits and returns. Profits 
(returns) accumulate deriveover time  from purchase commissions and interests payments that might 
be as agreed or in excess as a result of default throughout time. Therefore, a long term perspective 
(t=30 months) was taken to produce monetary and relative scores. Direct scores were obtained by 
using the predictor variables shown on Table 1. The probabilities of default and repurchase from the 
previous section were used as predictors in the indirect models. Four indirect models were obtained 
per measure: 
 
Y ~ƒ (x, z)                                   (5) 
where 
Y=EBITACUM30, ROACUM30 and x=DEF1, DEF2; z=REP1, REP2                            (6) 
Scores resulted from using Ordinary Least Squares Regression (OLS) was used, . Swith stepwise 
OLSselection of variables ( was used initially and subsequent iterations were run considering a0.01 
significance level of entry of variables of 0.01. Given that profits or losses only occur when customers 
actually purchased products, zero intercept models were used (i.e.: a baseline profit or loss at t=0 
cannot be assumed).  See Table 3.  The error rate was calculated per model to compare their accuracy 
of prediction as: 
 
































Percentage errorx =∑ (actual score – predicted score)/ ∑ (outstanding balance)                   (8) 
 
where: 
x= overpredicted or underpredicted values 
Yi( iYˆ ) = actual (predicted) score for customer i 
FBdefi = deflated final balance at t=30. 
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This was done to provide a common basis of comparison in both the training and holdout samples. 
The minimum error rate considered was 0%, which is the ideal case when predicted scores coincide 
with actual values.  
Following a similar rationale to that used to produce default and repurchase models, 
approaches a and b were followed for modelling purposes of EBITACUM30 and ROACUM30.  
Under approach a, a training sample was used to develop direct and indirect profit (return) 
scorecards were developed on training2 sample (because of the outliers, as explained earlier). These 
models were tested on a holdout2 to facilitate the direct comparison of results between samples. 
sample. Initially, training sample1 was used for modelling purposes of EBITACUM30 and ROACUM30. 
However, as explained before, outliers affected significantly the error rate particularly in the case of 
relative scores. Rather than using transformations and hence making assumptions about the actual 
values of the predicted scores, two alternatives were used to test accuracy of prediction. First, outliers 
from both variables (5% of the customers in this sample) were excluded from the training and holdout 
samples. This resulted in 24,617 and 6,186 customers in training sample2 and holdout sample2, 
respectively. This facilitated the direct comparison of results between samples.  Yet to test the 
predictive performance of models under extreme conditions in presence of unusual observations (a 
more realistic scenario), they were applied to holdout3 (holdout2  + all outliers, 9,347 customers).  
Second, outliers from both variables (5% of the customers in this sample) were excluded from the 
training sample and were subsequently included in the holdout sample. This avoided excluding any 
observation and assured testing the models under more extreme conditions. In total, 9,347 customers 
were left in holdout sample3, respectively.  
Under approach b, a ten-fold process was followedrepeated to produce overall models for 
monetary (relative) direct and indirect scorecards on training2 and holdout2 combined (30,803 
customers)., Outliers were excluded from the overall sample to develop the ten-fold model in order to 
be consistent with the standpoint taken in approach a. This resulted in an overall sample of 30,803 
customers. 
Coefficients of significant variables are not displayed for confidentiality reasons. 
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EBITACUM30: Direct scorecards  
In models E1a,b, monetary profits increase when customers are not singles (excluding 
divorced), belong to older age groups, live in urban areas, belong to higher socioeconomic stratums, 
have a higher education level, stay longer in the same address or purchase products different to the 
traditional portfolio. Most of these variables can be understood by relating them as well to higher 
probabilities of default and/or repurchase in the short and/or long term, as explained before. Likewise, 
profits increase as the loan duration increases. Even though they are less likely to repurchase, in the 
long term they have constantly paid more interests than if they initially took shorter term loans. 
Customers in the intermediate credit limit usage category are less profitable than those from the 
lowest category. This might result from their lower probability of repurchase in the short term. The 
two variables with the highest positive economic impacteffect are age and loan duration. The least 
economically significant variable is the type of product.  Even though the variable stratum does 
suggest that wealthier stratums yield higher profits, it is not the most economically significant 
variable. Its significance derives from repurchase rather than default. Furthermore, the variable type of 
job was not significant. Finally, the significance of other variables that apply to any customer 
regardless of his/her socioeconomic stratum impacts as well the overall profit per customer. 
Therefore, results reflect the inclusive lending nature of the programme. 
EBITACUM30: Indirect scorecards 
Regardless of the time horizon, in models E2a,b to E5 a,b profits increase as the probabilities of 
default and repurchase increase. These results are consistent with the nature of the credit programme, 
as explained before. The coefficients of probability of default vary between 32 and 69 times that of 
the probability of repurchase. Interests payments from default accumulate throughout time and may 
occur more than once; commissions from repurchases are received only at the time of each purchase. 
Table 3 shows that the best performing models were E2a,b and E3a,b, which have as predictors the 
probabilities of default at t=12 and of repurchase during t=12,(30) months. These results suggest that 
for profit scoring purposes, it is adequate to follow the payment behaviour of customers during the 
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first year of the observation period; this agrees with usual banking practices to predict default. In 
contrast, repurchase behaviour should be followed throughout the observation period. This follows 
from the definition of a revolving credit, which allows repurchases in the short and long terms.  
Overall results in Table 3 show that direct model E1 a,b outperforms indirect models E2a,b and 
E3a,b in terms of the error rate. This might be the result of additional errors included in the 
probabilities of default and repurchase when used as predictors for indirect models. Therefore, they 
should be used to score customers based on their monetary profits.  
 
RELATIVE SCORECARDS  
ROACUM30: Direct scorecards 
The following significant variables in direct monetary (E1a,b) and relative (R1a,b) profit 
models were consistent in sign: location, marital status, stratum, studies, loan duration (between 42 
and 55 months and missing loan durations), credit limit usage and type of product. Therefore, specific 
segments of customers are profitable both in monetary and relative terms. Other significant variables 
increase the return per customer in models R1a,b: having any type of contract, being self-employed, 
having a marital status different to single and loan durations between 36 and 37 months. Given the 
similar coefficients obtained for contract and being self-employed, it seems that the additional risk 
taken when granting credit limits to individuals that usually would be considered higher risks pays off 
when compared against that of individuals under more stable conditions. Specific significant variables 
in model R1a that increase relative profits include customers with secondary level of studies and those 
with more dependants. In the case of R1b, customers with education level different to missing increase 
relative profits at a decreasing rate as the education level increases. Finally, customers that work in 
other industries different to services or not formally employed lead to higher relative profits. This is a 
positive feature of the inclusive lending programme under analysis. 
 
ROACUM30: Indirect scorecards 
In Indirect models R2a,b to R5a,b, returns per customer increase when the probabilities of 
default and repurchase increase. Results for the best performing models (R2a,b and R3a,b in Table 3) 
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are consistent with those for indirect profit scorecards. These results suggest that regardless of the 
profit measure used, default requires a shorter observation period than repurchase. They confirm as 
well that current credit policies of the lending institution are very conservative, as the payment 
behaviour of utility bills is tracked for two years. Depending on the management attitude towards the 
credit risk implied in this inclusive lending programme, more customers could access it if the 
observation period for default is reduced to 12 months. Table 3 shows that direct model R1a,b 
outperforms indirect models R2a,b and R3a,b. Consistent with results for EBITACUM30, direct models 
should be preferred. 
 
 
IMPACT ON PORTFOLIO RESULTS 
Based on the results presented above, models E1a,b and R1a,b were chosen to assess the impact 
of monetary and relative scores on portfolio profits and returns. It would not be reasonable to compare 
indirect (underperforming) models with direct (overperforming models)ones. FigurValues are not 
displayed for confidentiality reasons. 
Figure 3 shows the portfolio profits and returns per acceptance band if models E1a, R1a, 
DEF1a and DEF2a are used to score customers in holdout sample3. Results for holdout sample2 and 
training sample2 showed a similar behaviour and are available upon request. It is clear that portfolio 
profits (returns) are higher when customers are accepted according to monetary (relative) scores. This 
was expected, as scorecards were designed based on the same measures at a customer level. The 
vertical distance between the curves is the opportunity cost resulting from scoring customers with the 
least beneficial alternative in terms of portfolio profits or returns. As the acceptance rate increases, 
more customers are accepted and the opportunity cost decreases until it makes no difference to use 
either monetary or relative scores, as there is no impact on portfolio results. Additionally, results show 
that monetary (relative) scorecards outperform default scorecards at t=12 and t=30 months. This 
shows that portfolio results can be improved if monetary (relative) profit scorecards are used instead 
of traditionally implemented default scorecards. Furthermore, Table 4 shows that Spearman 
correlations between direct monetary (relative) profit scores and default scores at t=12 and 30 months 
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are weak. Therefore, monetary (relative) profit scorecards provide an alternative perspective to default 
scoring. The complete sample including outliers (training1+holdout1) was used to assess the impact on 
corporate results under approach b. Results were similar to those of approach a. See Figure 4 and 
Table 4. 
Regardless of the type of score used, the same number of customers is accepted for same 
values of the acceptance rate. Therefore, it is a question of adopting the scorecard that is more 
appropriate according to portfolio objectives in terms of profits, coverage against default and the 
scope of the programme.  
In the case under analysis, some reasons would justify the adoption of monetary scores. First, 
the number of defaulters is very low compared with the total sample. Second, given that all the 
customers that were granted a credit limit paid on time their utility bills, the perceived credit risk is 
lower and hence coverage against default is not a priority. Third, the payment behaviour of customers 
has been stable regardless of adverse climateeconomic conditions that could eventually affect default 
rates. Finally, the additional cash generated by adopting such strategy results in more funds to grant 
further credit to new customers from the existing identified segment. If relative scores are used, 
foregone profits would result in fewer funds available to be granted to additional customers. This 
would reduce the scope of the credit programme.  
Relative scores would be useful for the lending institution under different conditions. First, if 
the Company’s objectives do not consider further growth in the served segment (i.e.: customers with a 
payment record of utility bills over the last two years) and instead prioritise the allocation of funds 
among customers that are potentially more “efficient” in relative terms. The portfolio of receivables 
would be healthier in terms of coverage against default. This would be perceived positively by 
stakeholders and regulatory authorities that are adverse towardsmay be cautious about inclusive 
lending, regardless of the customers’ previous utility payment record. Second, if more uncertainty 
arises as a result of socioeconomic or political instability then the aim would be to achieve higher 
rates of coverage against default. Finally, relative scores could be particularly helpful when the 
strategy is more ambitious in terms of inclusive lending. That is, when the aim is to diversify the 
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existing portfolio and penetrate new segments that are not being currently served and hence which are 
completely unknown in terms of credit records.  
 
CONCLUSIONS 
Based on the sample used in the analysis, it was shown that inclusive lending can be a 
profitable business (i.e.: almost all customers were profitable in monetary and relative terms). It also 
shed light on the impact of specific customer attributes on portfolio profits and returns; this may apply 
to similar contexts where lending institutions have a major role on responsibly increasing the access to 
credit of traditionally excluded segments.  
On the other hand, it showed that using relative and monetary profit scores is useful to further 
understand profit scoring for revolving credits. From a statistical perspective, it was confirmed that 
direct models score customers more accurately than indirect models both in monetary and relative 
terms. This extends the existing literature, as previous studies solely used monetary profit scores. 
Percentage differences between the error rates of direct and indirect models should not be overlooked 
as in monetary terms such difference is not negligible given the portfolio value of outstanding debts. 
Such differences stand for the foregone monetary or relative profits if indirect models are used 
instead. Therefore, from an economic point of view, direct scores should be preferred.  Indirect 
models are useful, however, as they provide useful insight to understand the significance that the 
probabilities of default and repurchase have on the generation of both monetary and relative profits. 
Consistent with the long term perspective of CLV for revolving credits, it was shown that the 
probability of repurchase should not only be modelled in the short term but also in the long term. An 
additional reason to predict default and repurchase prior to producing direct profit scores is that they 
provide useful insight to interpret results from significant attributes in more comprehensible ways to 
practitioners.  
From a financial perspective, additional insight was gained as the majority of variables were 
consistently significant in direct models for monetary and relative scores. Hence it is possible to 
identify segments of inclusive lending programmes that are profitable both in monetary and relative 
terms. This justifies taking the additional perceived risk. This is particularly useful to partially tackle 
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the dilemma between maximising portfolio profits and returns. Choosing between monetary and 
relative profit scores implies a trade off between portfolio profits and returns depending on the chosen 
scorecard. Other significant variables account for the difference between portfolio results when using 
either measure. The choice will be guided by the Company’s objectives and assessment policies of the 
lending institution. If financial results are usually assessed in terms of monetary profits regardless of 
the required investment (i.e.: as a profit centre), monetary scores will be preferred. This approach is 
less conservative as it does not account for default, which can eventually occur. It is therefore more 
convenient to implement it in times of socioeconomic stability and for segments that are similar in 
terms of purchase and credit payment behaviour. This will not compromise the ethical standpoint of 
the lending institution in terms of responsible lending. Still there is a foregone coverage against 
default in the event that it occurs. 
On the other hand, if credit granting policies are more conservative and hence aim at a better 
coverage against default, relative measures should be preferred. This might be the case of credit 
programmes that operate under stricter budget restrictions in terms of granted credits and hence are 
assessed as investment centres. They are also useful when socioeconomic conditions are more 
unstable. Furthermore, even though relative scores do not solve the ethical dilemma regarding profit 
scoring, they tackle it better than monetary scores. Customers are ranked considering not only the 
cash generated as a result of default and repurchase, but also the greater outstanding balance resulting 
from them.  The above considerations apply to any revolving credit. However, they are particularly 
useful to prevent overindebtness in high risk segments and hence to enhance more socially 
responsible inclusive lending practices. 
Further avenues of research include using mixed methods to complement results from 
quantitative models with qualitative data analysis. This will allow identifying reasons behind default 
and repurchase that ultimately drive customers to be more or less profitable in monetary and/or 
relative terms. A complementary approach could be to design behavioural scorecards that include 
credit bureau variables once customers start using their credit limit. This offers the benefit of 
assessing the impact of inclusive lending in the design of monetary and relative profit scores. 
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Figure 3: IMPACT OF BEST PERFORMING SCORECARDS ON PORTFOLIO RESULTS, 
APPROACH a 
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 Figure 4: IMPACT OF BEST PERFORMING SCORECARDS ON PORTFOLIO RESULTS, 
APPROACH b 
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Table 4: Spearman correlations, profit (return) scorecards and default scorecards 
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